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America and Laos : Two Views of Politica l
Strategy and Technical Assistance
Just as the novelist uses his artistic license to shape
reality in order to more dramatically present a particular poin t
of view, so we have in our contemporary society certain situa-
tions which, by their uniqueness, may help give us a broader
understanding of certain worldwide problems . Laos offers us
this possibility . Here the conditions of previously colonia l
and economically backward countries are exaggerated, . but their '
very exaggeration can give us new viewpoints and perhaps sugges t
fresh approaches . It is with this in mind that the following
paper is presented .
Certainly the situation existing in Laos today is no t
found, at least not to the same degree, in any other area o f
the world . The kingdom of Laos, land-locked in the heart o f
Southeast Asia, is about the size of the State of Oregon . The
population is estimated to be about two million . There are no
railroads . The number of roads linking the administrative
capital of Vientiane to the provincial towns are extremely
limited, and most of them are impassable during the rain y
season . There are no telephone connections among the towns o f
Laos (although radio and telegraph contacts do exist) .
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is country has probably the smallest number of colleg e
educated people of any sovereign nation . There is only one
fully trained doctor, only one pharmacist, two fully qualifie d
engineers and less than half a dozen men with any tra ing in
law. Most of the ministers have had the equivalent of a United
States junior highschool education . This holds true not only
for the present generation of Lao government officials, that is ,
n in their forties or fifties, but also for the younger people
in their early twenties who now hold government positions, Few
of the young Lao sent to study in French universities have been
willing or able to complete their courses and obtain degrees .
There are at present less than half a dozen Lao stude s in the
United States .
Approximately half the population of Laos is ethnicall y
-Lao and is composed of tribal peoples speaking language s
t iy unintelligible to the Lao . It is estimated that les s1L 3
than 10 per cent of the total population of the kingdom live s
in urban centers . Of this 10 per cent at least half are non-La o
and include Chinese merchants, Vietnamese craftsmen, French
inessmen, Indian and Pakistani cloth sellers and various
es of American and European
Isolated from world trade routes and for decades an un -
known corner of French Indochina, in and after the Second
World War Laos experienced in turn Japanese invasion, occupation
by Chinese troops, the reestablishment of the French colonia l
egi:.e, the Ir dochi ra War and tndpp -ndence . During the days
of French colonial administration Laos was regarded as a kind o f
Shangri-la, an exotic retreat . The events of World War II and
the Indochina war do not appear to have affected the fundamenta l
cultural patterns of Laos . Her sudden emergence five years ag o
as an inc•. pendent nation resulted in membership in the gaited
Nations and the establishment of Royal Lao Embassies in Paris ,
London, Washington and the major capitals of Asia . Vientiane
has changed from a tranquil provincial town to a nationa l
capital with ministries, a national assembly traffic jams ,
night clubs and air-conditioned movie s
Since 1954 the United States government has taken over
from France the basic economic responsibility for Laos . There
is a question in the minds of many as to whether Laos reall y
constitutes an independent po tical entity . Over the pas t
five years the United States has spent approximately two hundre d
million dollars in Laos (precise figures are not publicl y
available) and has been actively concerned with her politica l
and economic affairs .

e following American government
organizations operate in Laos : the Embassy, Information Service ,
aid program (United States Operations Mission (USOM)], and a
'Program Evaluation Office (the military advisory group) . With
so much money and effort being expended in Laos, it might b e
well to examine the impact of American policies and programs on
the following aspects of Lao society and culture : ethnic groups ,
Buddhism, village society, the official elite and, finally, the
American community .
Ethnic Groups
Since they constitute about 50 per cent of the populatio n
the Lao are the dominant group in the kingdom politically ,
socially, and culturally . They are valley dwelling Buddhis t
farmers who derive their main livelihood from raising rice in
irrigated fields . Related historically and culturally to the
, people of Thailand, their way of life is almost indistinguishabl e
from that of the inhabitants of northeast Thailand who are als o
known as Lao and with whom they share a common language closel y
related to Thai . There is, indeed, some question as to whether
_Laos would today be an independent state if certain minor kingdoms
and provinces of Thailand had not been annexed and combined by
the French in the process of acquiring Indochina less than a
-century ago .
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There are certain provinces such as Nam Tha in the north
and Attopau in the south where the overwhelming majority of th e
inhabitants are non-Lao, In the Lao government ' s attempt t o
minimize the distinctiveness of the various tribal groups an d
bring them together as citizens of Laos, they have set up a
classification of ethnic minority based on settlement patterns :
the Lac-Tai or lowland Lao, the Lao-Teng or upland Lao and the
Lao-Som or Lao of the mountaintops . (In this classification
the Lao refer to themselves as Lac-Lum, or valley Lao) . The
system is not in general usage in Laos, and after introdL?Cin g
it below, the various tribal groups will henceforth be referred
to in this discussion by the names traditionally used by th e
Lao . Many tribal groups related to those in Laos live i n
neighboring North and South Vietnam and northeast Thailand an d
others are found in Burma
The first category represents tribal Thai groups such as
the Thai Siam (Black Thai) and does not include the dominant
valley Lao themselves ; however, the two groups are related in
ethnic origins and in language . Like the Lao, the Lao-Ta i
traditionally had petty kingdoms . Today the Lao-Tai live mainl y
in the north of Laos and cultivate irrigated rice . They differ
from the Lao in certain animistic beliefs and in the socia l
structure of their communities, but perhaps the most significant
difference in terms of our concern here is the fact that the
valley Lao make a sharp distinction between themselves and th e
Lao-Tai . This is reflected in the proportionate lack of acces s
tribal Thai to education and in their relatively 'smal l
-numbers in government posts .
The Lao-Teng more commonly known as 3 = (the Lao word for
slave), are the largest of the ethnic minorities . -' ey are
video into many groups such as K.mu, Kha Ko and others wit h
varying customs and economies, some even speaking mutually un_-
intellig ale languages . 'ine Kha are the aboriginal i nhabitants
of Laos and generally rank lowest in the social scale . Living
Its'_9Cti~7C~C"7•~!'1'.'-C4`;L :~'•Se - .F:. '• .' •~f-:.w •,s .y. x+a~~'~a' .
chiefly on mountainsides, they cultivate upland rice in patche s
cleared from forested slopes by burning .
The Lao-Sam are the most recent arrivals in Laos, having
migrated south from China largely during the past century, They
live in northern Laos and are more familiarly known as the Meo
-and Yac . In the raising of opium they have an important cash
crop .
ong the many problems faced by these groups as they seek
a readjustment from their traditionally inferior status with
reference to the Lao are the questions of education, partici-
pation in the national government and sharing the fruits of
12-18-59
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modern western technology, to which they have all been exposed
to varying degrees, How then is this situation reconcilabl e
.with the terms one often hears about the peoples of Laos ,
especially the tribal peoples

terms such as "isolated, "
"indifferent" and "twelfth. century?" A partial answer is tha t
they are today simultaneously isolated and indifferent, dis-
contented and conscious of change . This becomes apparent i f
we take a closer look at the way in which these people live .
Flying over Laos, particularly over northern Laos, one can
spot many isolated villages high in the mountains . They consis t
of a settlement of two to three to about a dozen houses .
Occasionally only a single dwelling will be noted . The settle -
ments are surrounded by fields, gaping patches of charred
mountainside where slash-and-burn cultivation is practiced .
Here is clearly a case of isolation, for in northern Lao s
rket towns of any size are few and far between . But a closer
look at the landscape yields circuitous threads winding dow n
through the forest . These are rough mountain trails . some so
steep and slippery that not even hardy mountain ponies can
negotiate them . Many are impassable during the monsoon season .
- Despite their limitations, however, these trails are a rea l
means of communication and arteries of trade . Their winding
courses can be traced from tribal settlements down into a Lao
12-18-5 9
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valley market town, even though it may take a man a week or two
to make the trip on foot .
Although the way of life of many of the tribal group s
might appear aboriginal and spartan to the westerner, thes e
groups are absolutely dependent on trade for their very lives .
The trails are vital supply lines . A few of the items the
tribal peoples purchase include salt, metal knives and cloth ,
plus occasional luxuries such as kerosene, sugar and guns . The
Meo manufacture their own guns but must buy sulphur and nitrate
to make gunpowder .
Even in the small towns there are side effects of trade ,
for it is here that the tribal man first comes into contac t
with government officials, airplanes, automobiles (if only
jeeps), and possibly movies and clinics . He also is introduced
to many consumer items such as radios, which he desires an d
cannot afford . We have, then, isolation and dissatisfaction - -
isolation in a sense that his appearance in the trading cente r
is infrequent, and dissatisfaction in being confronted with al l
kinds of new goods and services of which he can take advantage
only to a ? im; te : extent .
It would be easy to say that the dominant Lao have exploite d
the tribal peoples, the Communists have cultivated them and
12-18-59
-9 -
American policy has ignored them . There are elements of truth
in this, but the actual situation is considerably more complex .
Imagine a scene at a small market town in the north .
ere are Meo, with their heavy silver neck-rings, Khrnu with
owel turbans . Yao women in intricately embroidered trousers ,
and Kha Ko in beads and indigo leggings . By merely sitting
around at the morning market, it is possible to see many type s
of ethnic relationships . The Lao women of the town come to
bargain with the tribal men and women who have made the lon g
trip down from their mountain homes to sell a few potatoe s
or betel leaves . In these small exchanges the tribal peopl e
' are usually paid in cash . They receive some paper bills with
ich they are unfamiliar . They are not sure if they have
received the correct amount for their product, but thei r
protests and doubts subside into passive resignation .
Across the way one may see a group of Khmu men, women an d
children hard at work breaking rock for a road . They have come
down to work for a few weeks during the dry season, in orde r
to earn enough to buy a supply of salt, a few metal implement s
and perhaps some clothing . Then they return to their upland
illages . They are usually unable to speak more than a few
words of Lao . This, however, does not prevent them from form-
ing ideas about life in the town . These ideas do not include
8-59
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any feeling of their own participation in the government . If ,
for example, a tribesman is accused of a crime and is brought
to court, proceedings are always conducted in Lao . Only rarely
are interpreters provided .
Yet many tribal people do bring back to their mountain
villages images of all the material goods and wonderful thing s
they have seen . Unable to achieve satisfaction through rational.
eans such as trading or the fruits of their own labor, it is -
'not surprising that they, like many other peoples in similar
situations, resort to magical means . Sometimes this takes the
form of a legend concerning a prophet who will launch them into
a new way of life . For the past few years in the province o f
Luang Prabang and neighboring areas, the myth of Djiung has
been circulating from one Khmu mountain village to another .
Djiung, so the story goes, is the white king of the Khmu wh o
lives in a v - t cave located somewhere in the north . At present ,
believers are told, he is not strong enough to leave the cave ,
but if all the Khmu will cease their work, sacrifice thei r
livestock and feast as a sign of respect he will came to them .
Some Khmu say they have actually seen the cave, where Djiun g
presides over a weird empire of mounds of rice, piles o f
clothing, rows of jeeps, airplanes, medicines, blankets, and
guns, all waiting to be distributed to his people . They need
only have patience and await his coming . Often Djiung's appear-
ance is predicted at a critical time in the planting season ,
and some Khmu have been in very real danger of starving to
death . The Lao officials have dealt with this by arresting th e
propagators of the myth and forcing the others ' do resume work
in the fields .
e present writer, during his service with the American
aid mission in Laos, had suggested that somehow the concept o f
Djiung be considered by both Lao and American officials when
planning rural aid because, in effect, the Americans wer e
supplying the treasures in the cave and both the Americans
and Lao, but chiefly the latter were in effect acting as agent s
f the prophet . This approach was rejected as necessitating
too much of an invoivment in tribal matters
Much has been written about the so-called underdevelop ed
peoples of the world being interested only in filling their
bellies and learning how to raise better crops rather than i n
the more abstruse concepts ol_ government : It is interesting to
mention here still another leg end . This one and the attemp t
at its propagation occurred in the summer of 1959, in a Me o
settlement only 60 miles from Vientiane . Near this particular
Meo village is a country inn frequented by high Lao government
-L3-5 9
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officials, so that the tribal people are in coneact with Lao
officials more often than is usual . A Meo villager went t o
work for some missionaries near the capital and returned to th e
village about six months later with this proclamation : Jesus
Christ, 18 feet tall, riding in a jeep and dressed as an American ,
would shortly appear in the village, Unlike Djiung, he woul d
not distribute gifts but •uld lead the Meo to the Promised
Land, that is, to Vientiane, where they would take over contro l
of the country from the Lao . The spokesman was well received
by many of his fellow-villagers and instructed them to depos e
the loca government-appointed officials . The officials is =rued
lice, and the man was wiled .
t is tempting to make the Lao and their political leaders
the villians of the situation, but before taking this easy pat h
let us examine some other approaches . It is true that the tribal
people are often cheated in the market place and exploited as
corvee labor (this practice is officially forbidden), but it i s
also true that there are longstanding traditional trading
relationships which have exis eed between Lao farmers and different
mountain tribes . ; r . o villagers spea .«ng tribal languages hav e
often acted as intermediaries between the tribal people and the
Lao government . Durint the time of the French, when head tax e
r- •
were imposed, these lam (interpreters) paid the taxes for thei r
tribal associates in return, the lam received forest product s
such as bamboo, betel and wild game, plus the labor of th e
mountain people
.ere have also been important ritual relationships .
After more than a thousand years of Buddhism, belief in various
animisti . spirits continues to coexist with more formal religiou s
practices among the Lao . Almost the entire population of Laos
believes in these spirits, or phi . The mountain peoples ,
having lived in the country longer, are felt to be more inti-
mately acquainted with them . Thus on certain occasions th e
Lao have invited the Khmu, for example, to participate wit h
them in buffalo sacrifices . When the French built the roya l
palate in Luang Prabang at the turn of the century, the firs t
person to enter was a Khmu chieftain who made peace with th e
resident phi .
The Lao are not a combative or aggressive people, and thei r
errors in dealing with tri.bal peoples have been largely thos e
of omission . They have failed to provide schools, healt h
services and roads, but then, it is also true that many of th e
valley Lao also lack these services . The Lao attitude is tha t
Laos is a small country, and the only way for all the inhabi-
tants to survive is to have the tribal peoples become Laotianized .
Therefore, no local languages are used in schools or governmen t
ousts . A country only recently emerged into nationhood i n
the modern world cane t be expected to have much perspective
on these matters, and perhaps not even to realize their pro foun d
political implications . This is not to excuse the Leo, but
both their leaders and their trained human resources are extre-
mely limited .
The goverrm ent maintains that the tribal people have the
same voting privileges as the Lao . However, aside fro : one
French-educated. i• eo family long associated with the Lee, whic h
has two members in the National Assembly, the only other triba l
representative is a Kha, who is a member of the Connunls t
Pathet loo, Few of the tribal people hold offices on the
district level, and there are only a few junior effieers i n
the Army . The Lao government ' s only real gesture of recognition
of non-Lao languages has been through a recently inaugurated
Lao Information Service p roject,

daily ten minute new s
broadcast in Meo and in one of the Kha d ie l e:. to
What is the American attitude toward this si. tnatton? Many
of the American officials stationed in Laos are sincere an d
conscientious . They are engaged in a multitude of project s
the aims of which are to better the living conditions of th e
peoples of Laos and further the economic development of the country .
- The programs, ambitious in scope, range from road constructio n
to publi* health nursing and technical education . Potential
programs which are not purely technical or political in the
strict sense of the word are usually sidetracked or ignored .
There seems to be a lack of desire to grope with broadly define d
cultural and political problems. The relationships between th e
-o and the mountain people is one of these .
There are a few partial exceptions, the most significan t
of which is the work of the United States Information Service
which has produced a film on the minority peoples, emphasizin g
e unity of the country . It has a Lao ,d-track .
|
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the minority groups have also been featured in various La o
language publications and posters which are distributed through-
out the Kingdom . The net effect of this propaganda is difficul t
to assess since only one • blic opinion survey has been made ,
limited largely to attitudes toward America .
e work of International Voluntary Services which has set
up an agricultural training center in the Meo area of th e
province of Xieng Khouang, and that of Operations Brotherhood, the
ilippine medical teams working in both Lao and tribal areas ,
should also be noted . Both these projects are supported by
United States aid funds, but neither pretends to be a compre-
hensive approach to the problem . Nor is there any American
job is primarily concerned with the question of the triba l
peoples . No orderly information exists in American files on
even the number of tribal groups, to say nothing of their
general economies and value systems . Nor do many America n
officials see the need for such information .
A number of Americans, particularly the technicians, hav e
adopted the Lao attitude of assimilation as the only solution ,
is might be a possible answer, if infinite time were involved
and if Laos did not have neighbors bent on destroying her socia l
and political system . But even the policy of assimilation i s
at most an implicit one ; to the best of my knowledge, the La o
government has no explicit policy with regard to her minorit y
groups . Go rnment officials in effect still practice discrimina-
tion, as, for example, in the allocation of funds for schools
and other projects .
In the past year many thousands of tribal Thai, ha and
Meo refugees have entered Laos from North Vietnam and China ,
fleeing the communes and other harsh measures of the Co rmunists .
However, the fact that autonomous tribal areas have been set up
by the Communists in the regions bordering Laos is not without
significance . Here these groups have their own administration ,
official among the dozens of planners and coordinat s whose: .3
in the sense that Communist directives are carried out by loca l
people . They also have schools in their own language . Nationa l
autonomous areas are, of course, nothing new, and these appea
to be modeled on the Soviet practice but with local innovations .
It should be emphasized here that according to official Lao news
dispatches many of the troops which have been fighting the Roya l
Lao Army are composed of Black Thai and Meo . The Black 'na
and Meo who live in Laos, although they may fear the Communists ,
do not appear to wish to fight on the side of the Royal Lao
government .:
t would be a distortion of facts to say that the triba l
peoples are against the Lao government . Nearer the truth would
be to state that although only some are in sympathy with the
Communists, those who will positively support the Lao governmen t
are few . Many Lao officials are seriously concerned, but s o
far no coordinated efforts appear to have been made in this ,
direction . One proposal heard with increasing frequency in .
various agencies of the Lao government is that of resettlemen t
of the tribal peoples in the valleys . In the lowland areas ,
so the argument goes, they will be more closely linked wit h
the government and they will also be able to farm more produc-
tively without destroying the forests . Some upland counities
have begun to move do .: with a limited amount of government aid,
2-18-59
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and in rare cases, entirely on their own . The Lao government ,
however, lacks the resources to undertake resettlement program s
on a national scale, and American planners do not view the
situation as one meriting their attention and funds .
|
Caere
have been no investigations of those who have moved down and
the types of problems they have faced . Here is an example o f
lack of imagination and flexibility in our governmen t ' s program
planning .
There is no question but that resettlement can offer an
attractive possibility to many tribal people . The attitude of `
the sole Yao working in the Lao government's Civil Action program ,
an intensive rural development project, is interesting in thi s
connection . He is a young man of 20 with approximately si x
years of schooling in a small market town in northern Laos .
His goal in life is to save enough money from his governmen t
service in order to return to his village and resettle his entir e
patrilineal family in. a nearby valley . He cited as advantage s
access to a school, a clinic, better farming conditionis and the
opinion that it is more civilized to live in a valley .
It is not the present writer's contention that resettlemen t
is the answer to improving relations between the Lao and minority
groups, but that it is a possibility which deserves being explored .
Other possible approaches include the use of minority languages
t
in the first few years of primary school . Certain Kha groups ,
for instance, refuse to allow textbooks written in Lao in thei r
villages . They claim this is offensive to their spirits . Ther e
is obviously a certain amount of nationalistic feeling involve d
here . The use of interpreters in courts should be considered .
The allocation of educational and health facilities to the
mountain people on an equitable basis would also be desirable .
An increasing sophistication in the use of techniques o f
information and propaganda would also help . The author was
present at a lecture given by a Civic Action worker to a grou p
of Kha Ko tribesmen in Muong Sing in Nam The Province . These
village headsmen, averaging between thirty and fifty years o f
age, had been summoned to the district town for a week-long
indoctrination course . The course was administered in the
following way : The headmen were seated in a semi-circle aroun d
the desk of the Lao official, who read to them from a mimeo -
graphed form . They listened obediently . The document was rea d
in Lao and translated by a second man into the Tai Lu language .
A third person then re-translated it from Lu to Kha Kt: . When
asked some of the Kha Ko headmen what they thought of havin g
schools in their village, hafting just received the lecture on
the values of education they replied that the phi would not
permit it and that learning to write Lao would be showing dis -
respect for their ancestors . This attitude is widespread
throughout the whole of Laos . The junior Lao official, a young
man in his late teens, was carrying out his work in a ver y
formal and authoritarian manner, and the net result of hi s
fforts appeared to be negligible . It is herd to see how such
procedures can be effective in uniting the country and in givin g
he mountain people a sense of participation in the nationa l
life .
Informally, certain Lao deputies in the National Assembly
have dealt with the problem of minorities in their own peculiarly
paternalistic way . They have gone out into minority villages
showing movies, talking to the people and occasionally distri-
buting gifts of clothing and medicine . In one instance, a
deputy brought several Yao headmen down to Vientiane and had
one of his assistants show them around the capital . Although
well-intentioned, these methods are hardly to be considere d
serious solutions to the question .
|
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The United States has sent to Laos experts in fields as
diverse as pig-breeding and malaria control . Is it not possible
to have people with the knowledge of minority problems to in-
vestigate the situation in Laos and make positive suggestions ?
A French scholar recently visiting Vientiane presented some
12-18-5 9
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. lectures on methods used by the North Vietnamese

Although
intended as a critical survey and expose, many young Lao in
the School of Public Administration were favorably impresse d
by what they were told . Thus, the lectures were actuall y
making propaganda for the Communists . Certainly the Unite d
States working with the government of Laos, can present a n
alternative .
Of course it is not possible for the American governmen t
to
|
down absolute policies and expect the Lao government t o
follow them . But as a chief supplier of aid, we obviously hav e
a position of great influence, which we appear willing t o
exercise in certain political situations of internationa l
concern but are evidently reluctant to use to help stabiliz e
' the internal scene .
Buddhism in Laos might at first be considered margin
to American interests a ~; . more particularly to planning in th e
diplomatic and economic aid fields . This point of view coul d
be accepted if our interests Le. Southeast Asia were narrowly
defined, On the contrary, very broad aims have been expresse d
in public policy delcarations in which the United States has
comm .` -: ed herself to maintaining Laos ° independence and freedo m
.„,t .
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from Communist control, in addition to aiding her economic
development . Many of our difficulties have come about becaus e
the implementation of these goals has been too narrowly inter-
preted . In order to implement broad aims which encompass the
whole of the society and culture, interest is shown only in
terms of formal diplomatic procedures, information activities
and certain fields of economic and technical assistance . It
is not my contention here that these fields of activities are
necessarily limited in their influence ; in fact it is possible
to maintain the opposite . The key concept should be interes t
conceiving the culture as a whole and seeing the effect of ou r
various efforts and programs as part of the total picture .
This would help American officials plan their programs with
greater effectiveness . Currently the effect of various unite d
States activities are being felt in all phases of Lao life
including the official religion .
Hinayana Buddhism has had a history of approximately 100 0
years in Laos . As indicated earlier it continues to coexis t
with the cult of the phi . Since Christianity has made relativel y
few inroads the Buddhism of the valley Lao is without questio n
the dominant religion of the kingdom . The Lao constitution
specifies that the King must be a fervent Buddhist . Monks
participate in almost all of ficial ceremonies and government
12-1 8 . 59
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officials pay homage to them on state occasions and in many
private ways as well . In most villages the Abbot of the wat ,
the pagoda, is the most respected figure in the community .
The precise relationships between Buddhism and America n
rograms and policy in Laos can be most clearly seen if we
begin by examining the ways in which American agencies hav e
come into direct contact with the monks or have incorporate d
references to Buddhism into their programs . American Embass y
officials deal almost entirely with the formal political hierachy ,
d the military aid mission deals with their counterparts i n
the Army . Here we have an interesting side effect caused n
large measure by the United States military aid program and to
a lesser extent by the economic aid mission's police program .
Foiier.ly, most Lao young men became novices or monks for period s
ranging from several months to several years and in many case s
completed their education in the pagoda : Becoming a monk was
a way of paying a spiri al debt to one's parents and achieving
'status within the community this applied to both villagers and
townsfolk .
Within the last few years many jobs have opened up in .
both the Army and the police . To the average Lao they pay
extremely well, the uniforms and work are glamorous and in
addition the jobs provide extra sources of income either through
obtaining supplies or straight graft (although the latter oppor-
tunities are certainly not universal) . As one village Abbo t
expressed it, "Our young men would rather become policemen than
monks and now value money more than honor ." This may be some-
thing of an exaggeration . It is not only the monks who are
affected . A school administrator remarked, "When it comes
time to look for a job, the most intelligent young men first go
to the army, then to the police, and only after they had been
refused work in government offices do they come to us as a las t
resort ." Military aid seems to be weakening a moral system
without offering a positive alternative .
Two other American programs are more directly involved with
the priesthood ; these are the Information Service and the
Community Development Division of the aid mission . USIS, recog -
•nizing the fact that the monks constitute a significant an d
respected element in the community and that the average citize n
has great respect for them and for Buddhism, has approache d
this problem in two ways . Perhaps the less important of thes e
is what might be called the use of Buddhist type propaganda
on a large scale . This includes printed materials, exhibit s
and films, many of which appeared in honor of the Twenty-fiv e
Hundredth Anniversary of Buddhism celebrated in Laos in 1957 .
One exhibit dealt with Buddhist art in the United States, and
special issue of the USIS magazine "Free World,issued i n
the Lao language, portrayed some of the holy shrines of Buddhism
in Southeast Asia and concluded with a description of Buddhists
in the United States . Lao newsreels have dealt with various
religious ceremonies . Again, few surveys have been made and
it is difficult to judge the impact of this propaganda . On th e
basis of a number of casual conversations with villagers, monks
and townspeople, it is possible to infer that the materials an d
films are favorably received, although they are not necessaril y
associated with United States objectives . An Abbot at one we t
handed some USIS Buddhist booklets to a visitor at the same
time telling him in very strong terms how the Americans were
ruining his country by corrupting the people . Information
agency officials would deny that they are seeking direct credi t
for producing this material ; rather their claim is that they
are doing it to produce a favorable climate, both for the La o
government and their o wn more Sp ecific propaganda . The extent
to which they are succeeding in these efforts is an open question .
More direct are English language teaching programs amon g
the monks . Several have been sent to America for advance study .
USIS also assists the priesthood in producing newspapers an d
other publications, The Asia Foundation, a private agency ,
which has only recently begun operating in Laos, has started
eel ta.ihiy uoL anti-american . rnis reeling would be reinforced
on observing USIS posters tacked on the walls of their living
quarters and seeing them enjoy USIS films at festivals given in
honor of the pagoda .
However, a few days later the American visitor might b e
more than a little surprised to see the same monk warmly receiv-
ing a Communist Pathet Lao leader and listening to him relat e
his heroic adventures in the jungle . The Communist present s
his life as one of sacrifice and self-denial for a noble end,
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. arousing sympathy in his priestly audience who link his effort s
to the ascetic tradition of Buddhism . This is particularl y
true since the Pathet Lao representative contrasts himself, a
poor man, with the rich officials who are linked to the American
. Imperialists . Among monks and townspeople as well as villager s
the Pathet Lao are known as the Po Pak or People of the Forest .
Let us examine further the learning of English by the
monks and the attitudes associated with it . For one thing, a
language can be used only as a technique and the culture asso-
ciated with it ignored or even reviled . An example is the
' fact that the North Vietnamese government publishes more Englis h
language propaganda materials than does South Vietnam . Accord-
ing to recent visitors to Red China English is still used as
the language of instruction in certain schools such as that o f
medicine in Peking, because of established tradition and the
difficulties inherent in switching over to Russian .
When asked by a non-Westerner why he is studying English ,
a Buddhist monk replied, "To get a good government job after
I leave the priesthood ." This seems far removed from the
concept of monastic life in our own culture, but we must no t
view the reply in terms of our culture . Buddhist monks remai n
in the priesthood only as long as they wish to, and the pagoda
'training is used by some as a kind of inexpensive boarding school .
Some are even rather aggressive in requesting special instruc-
tion such as English language training .
How is this desire for a government job reconciled then
with a pro-Pathet Lao attitude and an anti-government point of
iew? Of course, there is no reason why contradictions canno t
exist in an individual ' s thinking, but those who have thought
about this question have given these answers, "I will work
with this government until its leadership changes," or "Wit h
ncreased education I may obt .6= n a more favored position with
a new government ." This oos ition is particularly prevalent
among the younger monks in the larger centers such as Vientiane
and Luang Prabang .
Is this any reason for USIS to stop teaching English? No ,
but perhaps the teaching should be more closely integrate d
with the curriculum of the pagoda schools . At present some
USIS officers teach monks in their own homes or stop at the wa t
once or twice a week to offer instruction, but is it not possible
to consider having one or two USIS officers teach full time i n
the pagoda schools? All kinds of teachers, except those o f
strictly religious subjects, are badly lacking, and the schoo l
administrators would probably welcome almost any type of courses
on an intellectual level . For example, soon after the autho r
became friendly with some monks he was asked to lecture on
western religion at their schools . Courses could be given on
western history, customs, institutions and the philosophy o f
democracy . No religious commitment would be required from th e
tside teachers in a pagoda school since Buddhism does no t
view itself as an exclusive religion . We must be flexible and
r l e the need for coming into direct contact with Lao culture
Village Society and Aid Programs
We turn now to one of the praised but poorly understoo d
aspects of American. aid . It is almost impossible to discus s
this problem 1ithaut referring to the current best seller
The UglyAmerican, in which through a series of semi-fictionalize d
episodes the point is made that the only way to have a successfu l
aid program and by implication to achieve our politicaltoais i s
to have sympathetic American technicians working out in th e
villages with the people, This procedure is opposed to th e
clustered communities of Americans existing in the capital cit y
kee, ing each other busy with memoranda and cocktail parties .
Let us take a close look at the specific situation in Laos
d examine some of the programs and their results . Here we
are concerned with the interactions of three specific socia l
groups and the ways in which they administer and react to a
given program . The three groups are the American diplomat s
and aid officials ; the Lao govern ent personnel and the villag e
d tribal peoples of Laos who are supposed to receive th =
benefits of these given programs .
Let us start with the program . Like so many other aspects
of human behavior the further one is removed intellectually
and emotionally from the process of carrying out a progym, the
simpler it appears . Village aid might be interpreted as meanin g
the focusing of certain government services on the villag e
agricultural extension, public health, rural education, an d
the provision of appropriate equipment and experts when calle d
for . Even in a country with as rudimentary a government struc-
ture as Laos, agriculture, health and education are alread y
established ministries . However, on the prov .ncial, distric t
d village levels there arises a real problem of coordination ,
especially since there is an acute scarcity of trained personnel .
This problem is widespread in newly independent countries whic h
i :, e suddenly confronted with the political and econo 'ic i," lica-
tions of rural isolation and poverty . Partly with the
American experts in rural extension services, the government
of India set up a Ministry of Community Development to direct a
nationwide program of coordinated village aid . India's pattern
s been wide copied . Several years ago American aid officials
began to send Lao personnel to India to observe these programs .
In 1958 a Bureau for Village Development was set up in the Lao
Ministry of Social Affairs and in 1959 was allocated a modes t
budget to aid village development by participating in the
financing of projects such as road building, well digging an d
construction of other village facilities . These funds are to
be dispensed by regional committees composed of the heads o f
all the provincial departments, with the Governor acting a s
chairman .
Prior to the establishment of this organization the govern-
ment had concentrated much of its efforts on Civil Action, a
crash-type program modeled on a similar organization in Vietna m
which was active in resettling refugees from the North when th e
. Republic of South Vietnam was created as the end of the Indochina
r . Led by a Lao army colonel and financially supported b y
United States military and economic aid agencies, groups o f
dung men, mostly soldiers, were selected for six week courses
signed to make them " r ex• rts'° in education, agriculture ,
'health and propaganda . Then they were sent out into the field
to work in the villages giving advice and instruction, distri- -
- buting medicine and agricultural equipment and showing films .
-For various reasons which we will subsequently examine thi s
ogram has been largely abandoned .
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At present the Army, with backing from the American militar y
liaison group, is preparing another rural development progra m
to be administered by "Teams of Six . " The ultimate objective
is to have a team operating in every one of the 600 district s
in the Kingdom . These teams are similar in composition t o
those of the Civic Action program and are under the command of
a colonel in the psychological warfare branch of the Lao Army .
Their training is variable, ranging from a few weeks to severa l
months . These teams will reside permanently in the particular
district to which they are assigned and will not be mobile a s
was the case with the Civic Action teams .
At the same time the different to ical ministries of th e
Lao government have their own programs for village developmen t
and so have not been enthusiastic supporters of this Army program .
This is particularly true since the latter have been relatively
well supplied with funds while the ministries have had t o
stantly scale down their own projects . The technical minis -
tries are severely limited by lack of personnel available fo r
rural projects . In the Health Ministry they are occupied with
running the hospitals in the provincial - capitals .

e Agriculture
Minis try , with only a few people with any degree of technica l
training above highschool level, are largely occupied in running
erimental stations . It is the Education Ministry which ha s
t . , ... re-,r.
the largest number of trained personnel in direct contact wit h
villages .
A few years ago there was a program under which a number
of village teachers paid with American aid funds were instructed
to devote half the day to teaching and the other half to showing
the children carpentry techniques and gardening methods an d
instructing them in health practices . This program was even-
tually dropped .
Currently a Belgian UNESCO expert associated with th e
Ministry of Education has established a center staffed wit h
Lao personnel trained at the UNESCO Fundamental Education
Center in Thailand . Other village aid programs include th e
work of Operation Brotherhood . In addition to medical personne l
the Philippine group also has people trained in social work who
attempt some public health work. The American Internationa l
Voluntary Services team in Xiang Ihouang has a public healt h
nurse and also does work in agricultural education . Not al l
these small programs are in direct competition, of course, sinc e
they tend to operate in different parts of the country . The
work of the military, however, poses a problem for the civilia n
agencies engaged in similar activities . There are also con-
' flicts among American personnel and divisions corresponding
to frictions in the Lao government, since the expert under-
standably tends to associate himself with the agency with
which he has direct contact . It should be pointed out that
like most activities of the Lao government the above programs
are financed largely or exclusively with American funds .
How have villages responded to these programs? We can
give some sample responses to the Civic Action program . Civi c
Action was intended to make an immediate impact on the villagers ,
showing the people that their government had a real interes t
in their welfare and in bettering their living conditions in
a dramatic way . In one case, a Civic Action team went to a
village and put up a row of houses - after their departure the
villagers were asked their rea.ct-i on . They replied that th e
rk of the government officials had nothing to do with them ,
for they were not told about the team's activity . When asked
if they would use the houses they said they already had goo d
homes of their own and even in case of need they would prefer
to build their own since those put up by Civic Action were
poorly constructed .
A visit to a Civic Action model village about twenty mile s
from Vientiane was revealing . On the main road is a brightly
-lettered sign pointing to the village, and after turning off
to the village trail the traveler is inspired by further signs
every few kilometers . Arriving in the village he finds that
an attempt has been made to pave the lanes . There are also
street signs, but during the rainy season these efforts ar e
largely obliterated . The model section consists of a neatly
fenced compound at the edge of the village . Inside the enclo-
sure is a new concrete well, a school, a hall and first ai d
station plus a school and living quarters for the Civic Action
personnel . A flower and vegetable garden is included in the
compound . On the day of the writer's visit, the Civic Action
personnel were all away but several of the village elders were
happy to chat about the project . They said they were not con-
sulted about the location of the new facilities nor did they
request them . The man who owns the land on which the new build-
ings were erected was informed that if the project proves a
success he would be paid in a few years ; otherwise the land
would be returned to him . The villagers do use the new concret e
well, but there exists the sentiment that the original well o n
the property had been taken away from its owner and that th e
new well does not belong to anyone . The village children us e
the school but the people are talking about erecting thei r
"own" nearer the pagoda . All the buildings in the compound
were constructed by hired labor imported for the occasion from
Vientiane . The villagers had expressed great interest in having
a permanent nurse assigned to them, but at the time of the
writer's visit in the svmmer of 1959 this had not yet taken
place . When asked what kind of project they would consider
most important to them, the villagers replied that a good roa d
linking their community with the main road was something the y
all desired .
Other Civic Action activities have included courses o f
approximately one month duration to all county `muong) chiefs
and then allowing them to spend brief periods in other part s
f the country to gain some perspective on their own loca l
problem. There have also been conferences of the provincia l
governors . Less intensive courses have been given to distric t
and village chiefs (tassengs and nai bans) in certain provincia l
centers . The tassengs are locally elected while the count y
administrator (chao muongs)are appointed by the central govern-
ment and are part of the Lao civil service . In any case ,
because of the change of programs these courses are not bein g
continued .
Continuity is extremely important in principle as well as
from the point of view of the villagers and the Lao officials ,
but this is lacking in all these programs . When the author
.,
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traveled upstream on the Mekong River in 1957 as the representa-
tive of the American aid mission in northern Laos he was asked
at many villages why the school teachers had not received
vegetable seeds as they had the previous year . It was hard t o
explain to them that that had been a "one-shot affair" and tha t
if the seed project were reinstated it would be under the agri-
cultural division of USOM, not the education division whic h
made the original distribution . In all fairness to the American
aid personnel and to the Lao government, consistent planning i s
difficult since it must vary from year to year depending o n
fluctuating Congressional appropriations . This system is als o
rather wasteful '
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Programs such as Civic Action, the Teams of Six and others
where the free distribution of commodities plays a large rol e
has put many well meaning Lao government and American aid offi -
cials in the position of traveling around the countryside an d
asking the villagers what kind of assistance they would like t o
have . Since this commodity assistance is paid for almost entirel y
by American aid funds, it sets up high expectations on the par t
of villagers which their government cannot hope to fulfill o,rer
an extended period of time . In addition the villagers are
recipients of government charity . This can hardly lead to
oncepts of responsible citizenship
,The village aid program organized a 1 the over a year ag o
with the assistance of the Community Development Division o f
SOM is an attempt to meet this problem. Under this new program
he government provides a certain amount of capital for a given
project tnd the villagers provide the balance and furnish a
the labor . This program is undoubtedly one of the most fruitful
to have been undertaken to date and has potentialities . Among
is positive points other than emphasis on labor and cash con-
tri' . Lion is the fact that the village initiates the request .
It is acted upon not by the central government but by a group
of provincial officials who tend to be much more familiar with
pedal local problems
Viewing this program as a whole, the largest number o f
projects and the greatest amount of funds have been concetrated
in building or repairing pagcd.as . Considering the values o f
o culture both rural and urban, this is not at all surprising .
intaining a wat not only provides a community facility, often
used as a general meeting place, but also adds to religiou s
merit making possible a better rebirth . Ideally, this should
e a way in which the USOM program could gain much good wil l
or "merit" . However, our officials have had their
|
ds tied
by Congressional legislation dealing with the foreign aid prog-
g

a legislation reflecting ethnocentrism and pressure groups
in our own culture, specifying that no aid funds can be used to
help non-Christian religious groups . To a certain exten t
American officials have gotten around this by claiming tha t
he funds have been used to build rest houses or village schools .
This is not completely illogical since bo of these functions
are performed by village pagodas . In any case our officials
are prevented from using this situation in the most advantageou s
way in terms of making an impact on local public opinion .
The lack of technicians to follow up on certain activities
- an also create difficulties . For example, if a new concret e
well later becomes polluted expert advice on the best way t o
lean it is usually lacking, The villagers have no way to sen d
for such a person even if he were e ail-b1e . As a result some
wells are abandoned when they could eas' be made serviceabl e
again .
It is also hard to put across the reciprocal nature of th e
program, and some villages see in it the possibility to obtain
a free gift . In one village the people were given galvanize d
sheet-metal roofing for a pagoda, but c struction had not eve n
begun so that the roofing was sold and the money put into a
eneral fund until more could be raised . This metal roofing
is an important prestige item in many areas, buc whether it is
an essential item in a village development program _ . ght be
questioned .
r• r7 '
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As might be expected distinct favoritism _s shown to La o
villages as opposed to those of other groups . The explanation
hat the mountain villages are scattered and small in population
is only partially convincing . Perhaps the most significant
ng is that small as the funds set aside for non-Lao groups
are, they are proportionately larger than they have been in
analogous situations in the paste This seems to be a trend .
In certain provinces more schools are being built in triba l
villages and some Lao officials at least are more aware of thei r
responsibilities toward the mountain peoples .
We can infer from this brief survey that certain program s
are not clearly defined . In many c- es they are d ? icated and
compete with one another .
No matter how thoughtfully and idealistically conceived
a program will not work well unless there is some follow-up
-valuation -- that °s, a chance for analysis and revision t o
eliminate defects . Thus far the American aid o Lfrc als hav e
been so busy ccnceivip.g programs and having them approved in
ashington that they appear to have had little energy for
eve l..a Lion . JEnd use observers for checking the expenditure s
of funds and uses of equipment of foreign aid missions hav e
been discussed extensively in Congressional hearings, bu t
applying research procedures to assess the impact of aid programs
if
on rural populations is thought to have no practical value in
an action program. Actually whether the funds are wasted or
of in a purely economic sense is often not the only importan t
to

Equally significant is the e political and social
effect . This is something in which our aid planners have no t
yet shoo serious interest .
Lao Officials
let us look now at the Lao officials in Vientiane and the
ways in which the American aid program has affected their values .
Closely related to the question of village aid has been the
great difficulty in persuading Lao officials, particularly thos e
0 fiddle rank to spend more time in rural areas . Although i t
was not our aid mission's announced intention, a significant
result has been to make Vientiane a much more attractive p lac e
o live from the point of view of the average government official .
At the same time conditions in the villages have remained basic -
ally similar e Since the beginning of the American aid program
Vientiane has blossomed forth with air-conditioned movies with
inem.,ascope screens, pastry shops, night clubs with taxi dancers
imported from Haag Kong and Saigon, many new restaurants, a
startling increase in the number of automobiles -- to say nothing
improved educationa l and hos tal facilities . any of these
innovations might appear rather primitive or even pathetic t o
the sophisticated westerner, but to a Lao with six years o f
ducation who at most may have had a trip to Bangkok or Saigon
these :developments have great appeal . Certainly they are muc h
more enticing than what provincial towns have to offer an d
infinitely more so than an average village of Laos, which mos t
ikely is reached by trail and has neither electricity nor
radio .
Such a situation is by no means unique to Laos . In fac t
countries as industrially advanced as the USSR have had articles
in their newspapers complaining of the difficulties in getting
officials to leave Moscow . But the problem is acute in Laos ,
where in many areas contacts with the central government exis t
in name only . For example, in the setting up of the Fundamenta l
Education Center the teachers who were trained in Thailan d
hawed a positive distaste for living in villages on a permanent
basis . As a

ult, their center was established on the edge
of Vientiane rather than in a village area removed from the
capital as was desire : ' by the UNESCO expert . In the course o f
their travels several of the students had managed to acquir e
automobiles which operate quite well on the streets of Vientian e
but which would do poorly on muddy village roads .
it
In another case a high Lao government official asked a
Meo headman to move down into the valley so he could more easil y
come in contact with the tribal leader . As he explained to the
Meo, "I can travel only by road . "
Some American officials have cited the increasing preva-
lence of cars and bicycles as a sign of economic advancement .
Compared to other countries of Asia and even certain countries
n Europe, automobiles are much more common among Lao officials
of the higher and middle ranks . Thus almost every Minister
and department head has a Mercedes Benz and some have several .
A certain number of these are furnished officially . Middle
rank officials such as, for instance, a Lieutenant in the
Police, may have a Nash Rambler . Less fortunate ones have motor
ikes or bicycles . Jeeps are also extremely common, many o f
which have been furnished to various government agencies unde r
the American aid program . It is quite true that no American
gency has officially furrished expensive civilian automobiles
to Lao government official but almost all have come in as
b

oducts of our subsidization of the Army and the genera l
economy of Laos . All the gasoline necessary to run them is
mpcrted, and since Laos has very few exports these import s
would not be possible if the American aid program were dis -
e operation of these automobiles contributes to
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the pleasure and convenience of Lao officials and merchant s
and represents a drain on the national economy of Laos . This
raises a sharp question : to at extent can American officials
control the use of the aid funds ?
A great deal of construction of homes, office buildings, ,
hotels and stores has occurred in Vientiane within the pas t
few years . To service these new buildings the American aid
mission has in , ailed a diesel- erated power plant which
replaced an earlier charcoal-operated one . Undoubtedly a certain
growth of Vientiane is inevitable in the development of Laos a s
national state, but to a large extent the present boom i s
artificial based as it is almost entirely on. outside aid .
Just as Laos cannot operate its power plant nor it- auto-
mobiles without foreign imports, so she cannot feed her urban
population withoutimporting rice . me major amount of ric e
onsumed in the Vientiane area is still purchased from Thailand .
The roads connecting Vientiane with the provinces are safel y
open only during the dry, season . Those areas which produce
a rice surplus often lack means of transporting it to Vientian e
Some local industries sum as logging and sawmills have
begun to develop but they are still in their infancy . They, too ,
are handicapped by lack of all-wee t .her roads , It is not the
'ter's intention to|°_e a detailed survey of the economic
problems of Lao but merely to indicate their existence . The
concern here is the effect of the development of the capita l
city on the contacts between Lao officials and the villagers .
Social and economic distance has definitely been increased .
Asa F -e ci sc'ho : ar it it, "h villager can more easily approach
an official on a bicycle than if he rides in a chauffeured
Mercedes Benz . "
Resentment is strop; among the rural population, and th e
writer has been eked any number of times, "Why is it that you
Americans give all your money to the rich people who live in
town and never think of us " This issue has been exploited by
the Pathet Lao in election campaigns and is perhaps one of th e
reasons why so many of theij candidates won by large majority
n the last election in 1938 . The villagers a query is not true
in theory ; if one examines the aid program, one sees that man y
of the projects are directly concerned with rural people .
Nevertheless, technical aid as opposed to military aid is
r - : atively small .

if one includes the funds available for.
road building, the total technical program has averaged les s
than four million dollars annually . By contrast the militar y
id expenditure is more than four times as great . Roya l
Lao troops in the provinces often spend their salaries locally .
rThis could perhaps be considered an indirect fe • of rural e id .
I 1n-
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But a good portion of military aid funds have remained in
Vientiane, partly as a result of their illegal manipulatio n
by Lao officials and partly through an import program at th e
artificial united States subsidized exchange rates which pre-
vailed until last year . Under this program large profits were
made, some of which were subsequently reinvested in Vientian e
business and real estate . The import program of consumer goods ,
of which much has already been written, was designed to absor b
the Lao kid, generated by payment of salaries to the military .
Perhaps the most crucial factor has been that the livin g
standards of the officials, particularly those in the uppe r
echelons, has greatly increased while the living standards i n
the countryside have remained stable , thus increasing the ga p
between the elite and their fellow countrymen (even though the
~"3Tr°'~`!~`•'r~[~rTrfiww!~JLIRRi~6ir~
living standard of the former are still quite simple by European
and particularly American standards)) . The political implication
of this widening gap cannot be ignored . _
American Community in Laos
C
In considering the triangular relationship existing amon g
the Lao officials, the villagers and the Americans in Laos, i t
remains now to take a brief look at the American community .
The four components of this community were named in the
introduction to this paper . Personnel figures vary, but at the
present time it is safe to estimate that there are well ove r
200 employees of the United States government in Laos .
In the Embassy, in addition to the Ambassador and Consul ,
there are a number of officers who deal exclusively with political
' affairs, as well as a commercial attach and various aciiinistra-
tive officers . USIS is headed by a Director and Deputy and has
people engaged in specialized affairs such as press, film an d
cultural affairs, in addition to several provincial affair s
officers . The largest group cf americans are associated wit h
USOM, and PEO, the military aid mission . The following is a
partial listing of some of the divisions of the aid mission ,
earh o which hos a full tie Amer" car sta ff : Programming
Planning, Agriculture, Health, Education, Community Development ,
Public Administraticn and large divisions concerned with personne l
and administrative matters, that is, technical support for th e
Americans .
Since there is a lack of locally trained personnel grea t
numbers of so-ca ied Third-Country Nationals have been importe d
o Vientiane to assist the American officials in various tasks .
Ong the nationalities represented are Filipinos, Thai ,
Vietnamese from Saigon and Chinese from Hong Kong . They perform
a variety of jobs -- secretaries, accountants, translator -
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interpreters, warehouse clerks and administrative assistants .
The Lao employed by American agencies are, with very few exce p-
tions, coolies and chauffeurs .
Each of the American organizations has its own separat e
headquarters . In each case, it is considered inadequate an d
is in the process of being expanded . The Embassy is currently
adding a new wing, and the Information Service has recentl y
moved to larger quarters occupying one floor of a new hote l
in Vientiane . In addition to a large barbed-wire-enclose d
compound of barrack-type office buildings and staff housing ,
USOM has recently taken over a three-story air-conditioned offic e
building in another part of town . PEC facilities have expanded
by moving into some of the former USOM buildings and also con-
structing new ones .
The , he American community operates more or less independentl y
o of the local economy . There is a co .iss ar y, which is stocke d
with jai-weekly air-shipments from the larger American warehous e
in 3 ngkok, and the community is serviced by its own carpenters ,
plumbers, water tracks and 24-hour a day chauffeur service .
There are several housing compounds for the official Americans
and their families . One consists of a group of about two
dozen prefabricated aluminum houses . Another compound, thi s
one of American style ranch homes, is located several kilometers
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outside the capital and is currently being enlarged from 14 t o
84 houses . On the periphery bachelor quarters for Filipino
employees of the mission are being built .
With housing and transportation provided and with foo d
and various types of recreation available within the community ,
it is entirely possible for Americans in Laos to have no contac t
with the peoples of Laos should they so desire and the nature
of their work permit . Their offices are usually separate fro m
the corresponding Lao ministries . In one of the few cases
where Lao and American offices are together, it is interestin g
to note that the latter's police advisory group has its o n
detached airconditioned building located on the grounds of the
main police station .
What effect has this policy of exclusiveness Had on th e
local population : No attempts to examine this question have
been made by American officials, but local French scholar s
have undertaken an extensive public opinion survey and analysi s
of the attitudese..~  and

the differen tinterrelationships among
ethnic groups in Vientiane . Comments were solicited from
various strata of society in the capital from pedicab driver s
to middle-echelon government officials . Certain reactions
seem to predominate with regard to Americans . the one hand ,
the material culture or, as the French-educated Lao say, the
technique of the Americans was very much admired . Further ,
the high salaries offered by Americans made working for them
desirable, On the other hand, the exclusiveness, to the extent
that some informants telLued it racism, was hotly resented .
These viewpoints were not universal, it must be mentioned, but
they were nevertheless widely held .
To maintain a self-contained American co inity in a
ountry such as Laos is no easy task . It is only recently tha t
housing conditions, office space and commissary supplies hav e
been termed adequate ° Having reached this point , most of the
divisions of the official American community are now stressing
he need for increased personnel .
Many of the technicians associated with the American ai d
program fail to see the broad political

lications of their
work . This is partly the result of their having received little
f any orientation regarding the history, culture and economy
of Laos . Apparently little effort is made to enable the tech-
nician to see wh a his personal effort fits into e overal l
picture, Classification of such information heightens thi s
roblem e
Individual attitudes among Americans range from those wh o
count the days until the end of their assignment and wonder
how they ever came to be scat " .•ned in such a place, to those
who show a real curiosity about the country and the people .
The opinions of the former, often openly expressed in front o f
the Lao, do not help create a favorable impression . At the
ame time little is done by the American officials in charg e
to encourage the latter in their point of view .
Conn his ions
It is not possible to tie up all these complex factor s
in one neat package . The information presented here has pur-
posely been given in a brief and somewhat impressionistic style .
Detailed factual documentation has been omitted, since thi s
is a preliminary report designed to stimulate comments and
discussion . Enough examples have been given, however, t o
ndicate some of the specific problems involved . The following
are tentative conclusions :
1 .

Problems faced in Laos reflect in exaggerated form
difficulties confronting American policy in many other part s
of the world . Perhaps the most crucial factor is our govern-
ment's lack of long-range planning and our inability to see
the effects of our aid .rogram as a whole . During the past
few years we have had a unique opportunity for leadership i n
Laos . Both the officials and villagers have received American
representatives in a friendly manner . What we have had to offer .
them has been largely a sterile form of anti-Communism, preserva-
tion of the status quo and an abundance of material gifts .
A high ranking officer in the United States aid mission told
the author that it was necessary to proceed slowly in technica l
assistance programs because otherwise we might disturb the
traditional social system . He seemed quite unaware that our
aid program has transformed the social system at least in th e
towns and has given villagers many new ideas . After five years
nd the expenditure of approximately two hundred million dollar s
on a population of some two million there has been little
positive economic development in terms of exports or smal l
industries . There does not even appear to be much enthusias m
for the Royal loo government . This should not be interpreted
to mean that the majority of the population is pro-Communis t
but rather that most people appear to be indifferent . Our
huge outpour of aid has provoked little enthusiasm; even in
ertain non-Communist quarters it has caused hostility . In
al ° fa' rr es s to both America pnd Lao pdminist ?toga, it is
necessary to bear in mind that the programs chief aim and
major funds have been military .
At this point one might logically ask, "Isn't an army one
of the first requirements for the continued existence of Laos
and hasn't this need been proven by the recent Vietnamese
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incursions in the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phon g
Saly" Further, to paraphrase State Department officials ,
"Isn't the continued jturvival of Laos proof of the value o f
our program?" These statements certainly have much to suppor t
them. Yet it is possible to disagree, not with their factua l
imp lications but rather with a point of view they seem to
represent . In fact, the basic point of view expressed in thi s
paper is not that the American program has been an utter an d
complete failure -- this is patently false -- but that it ha s
not been sufficiently imaginative . It is quite true that Laos
is still an independent nation, but one questions hiong it
will remain this way and to what extent the people associat e
their fate with that of their government o
No one has ever seriously contended that the Lao Army
could provide more than a deterrent or temporary obstacle t o
the armies of North Vietnam, to say nothing of the military
forces of China . This writer maintains that by concentrating
on external military forces insufficient consideration has been
given to the threat of internal sub rsion or even to Communis t
control through legal elections . In fact certain Lao official s
have talked of postponing elections for fear of Pat :et La o
victory .
By oncentrating primarily on a program of direct military
subsidies, even defense associated activities such as road con-
truction have never been undertaken in a serious or comprehen-
sive manner . With most of our funds going to pay the salarie s
of soldiers and police, we have yet to aid in the construction
of any all-weather roads . Would it have been possible to ge t
along with less personnel, or pay them smaller salaries? Coul d
thelabor have been enlisted in tasks such as road 'Dui ing ?
Should we have provided more aid in the form of materials o r
even overseen the construction of projects and then turned the m
over to the Lao as the French have done as, for example, in th e
ase of a lj,cee in Vientiane? To what extent has our emphasi s
on military aid reflected the ideas and values of leading La o
government officials or the population at large? What types o f
programs are most likely to enlist the support of the rural
population? Have we over-extended ourselves by attempting t o
si, : : taneously initiat programs in fields as diverse as publi c
health, transportation, education and agriculture, each with
many separate projects, or would it have been better to concen-
. trate our efforts in only a few fie Yids • These are some of the
questions which deserve discussion and have so Ear received
little attention Many of these matters are obv -•usly interna l
affairs of the Lao government, but they do become an American
al-icy concern when the expenditure of foreign aid funds is involved .
I' . ..11'

14 :1
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As has often been stated, Communism is above all a system
of ideas that can best be met on the ideological level regard -
less of whether it is an ideology oriented toward intellectual s
or peasants . Our ideas of individual liberty, political demo-
cracy and the creative value of labor badly need redefinin g
in the light of Southeast Asian cultures . The United States
cannot, nor do we wish to, force our ideas on others but we
can make them attractive as possible . Certainly, the over-
emphasis on the amount of aid rather than the kind of aid and
the way in which it is administered may move to be misleading ,
The author believes that Americans are capable of representin g
more than a technology and high standard of living .
2 . Let us turn now from broad no licy objectives t o
instr-entai matters : the securing by our diplomatic and
economic aid missions of certain types of inferm...ation which
have to date been rather consistently ignored . Aside from
working with economists and to a lesser extent political scien-
tists, our diplomats and technicians have generally avoided
using services o . specialists in the fields of sociology, antrho-
pology, social psychology, agricultural economics, huma n
geography and demography . Inquiries concerning basic information
on Laos usually meet with the response that the data exists but
that it is classified . More than one official admitted to the •
writer that some reports were not correlated to give a meaning-
ful over-all view nor were they generally available . USOM
ilex are full of highway, river and airport surveys . No one
. seems to know how much cash income an average farmer has o r
how much rice he grow, the way in which a Buddhist temple is
organized or what the characteristic features of Lao Buddhism
are as opposed to the Thai or Cambodian versions . This neglec t
f cultural factors and concern with the mechanics of operatin g
programs rather than with people and ideas seems to be a fairly
deeply imbedded characteristic of many aspects of cur aid pro -
gram .
3 .

It is difficult to imagine an aid program pleasin g
to all parties concerned . 'here are hard working, well traine d
nd conscientious Americans in Laos who do travel in the pro-
vinces . By and large the various point Four assistance programs
ave been well received . Some sense of partnership does exist ,
• particularly bet en American and Lao technici But a few
positive achievements do not necessarily make for success in
the overall program .
Most Lao government officials at the bol i cy making leve l
are in sympathy with our ob ctives, nam41y to p'-serve Lao
independence and prevent Communist infiltration at the same
providing technical and economic assistance enabling the
government of Laos to eventually be self-supporting, capable o f
effectively governing her own people and providing them with
'tame of the services deemed necessary in the contemporary world .
To our detriment however, we have failed to inspire a real
sense of partnership for the achievement of these goals which
we share . Many Lao elite seem to have the impression that our
nterests are those of only short term expediency . The points
of view one hears so often in the United States to justify ou r
military and economic aid programs are frequently anathema t o
' the people for whom the aid is destined . An example of thi s
pproach is the idea that we primarily wish to deny to th e
Communists a strategic land, or, as more blatantly expressed
by many disillusioned lower echelon American officials in Laos ,
''fie are only renting real estate here ." Is it surprising tha t
such an attitude accompanied by the distribution of large sums
of money often leads to cynical corruption and embezzlement o n
a large scale? Or as more than one high ranking Lao officia l
declared, "Our foreign policy° merits American assistance, "
with the implication that if this were not forthcoming the way
might be opened to a change in their policy .
Our involvement in Laos and Southeast Asia is basicall y
not a short range affair but a long terra commitment . Thi s
actor needs to be stressed more in our dealings with countries
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such as Laos . It is unlikely that this wi ? l be done as long
as the need for long-range commitments is not accepted by either
Congress or the public at large . This is not to imply that w e
should indefinitely continue our aid program to Laos on the
same basis as we have for the past five years, that is, defacto
support of the major part of the government budget in almos t
all areas and complete support in military matters . We should
explore with the peoples of Laos ways in which dependence can
be lessened and positive economic and social progress achieved .
From the point of view of the American taxpayer this is als o
he cheaper way, as many observers have pointed out, but lik e
many true economies this requires vision and imagination or
what has been called enlightened self interest .
4 . The evolution of a more positive American foreign
policy in Laos and Southeast Asia generally, however, requires
more than Congressional action combined with dedicated and
imaginative leadership . It needs the modification of certainthe
American cultural traits, which is something considerably mor e
difficult . This raises the intriguing and broad philosophica l
question of the extent to which we are capable of consciousl y
shaping our modes of behavior for the achievements of agreed -
upon goals . Anthropologists and philosophers have wrestled
with the problem without coming to any definite conclusion .
I2-18-5g
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How would this relate to our aid program in Laos? Some
of these p atterns have been mentioned

for example, the
creation of a Little America in an alien cultural setting i n
terms of housing, food, office procedures, recreation and reli -
gion, to name some of the more important items . Is this so
different from the behavior of French, Russian, Chinese, or
British in similar situations? No, but there is a quantitative
difference that has qualitative implications . The American
standard of living is the costliest in the world To duplicat e
the various types of appliances, processed foods and housing
to which the average American is accustomed re u irequires much more
effort than to provide analogous conveniences for French ,
Russian, or British overseas communities . Our prodigious wealth ,
however, enables us to set up little Americas overseas and to
provide a good portion of stateside conveniences . Some materia l
accoutrements tend to be more heavily stressed in America n
culture, as anyone familiar with French plumbing or Britis h
household heating can readily observe . As we have already seen
these material embellishments tend to create barriers between
Lite .the Americans and the local population, even among th
e Two seemingly contradictory aspects of American cultur e
which coexist, although not without conflict, tend to be stresse d
in the implementation of foreign aid program :
ction and organization . Historically, America was a frontier
land, and many elements of our national character can be traced
through the types of society developed during the push Westward .
One of these was an emphasis on action, sometimes for its ow n
ake, as opposed to reflection and consideration of alternative
auses of behavior . In addition C b -~. ng a country deve to .~ d .
as part of a pioneer settling of a vast land, America is a
huge, complex nation-state, with one of the largest population s
n the world and probably the most involved technology on earth .
The administrative apparatus of this entity has evolved
at a rate even faster than that of the economy . This has been
readily apparent even to those Who have not read the little
book by Professor Parkinson in which he maintains in a no t
entirely satirical manner that the number of administrativ e
personnel increa= s regardless of the work to be performed .
It is not my intention to maintain. that this ccncept is applic-
able to agencies of the American government in Laos . What is
mDortent in this instance is that the administrative structure
is a large and involved, e , ich is in er

respects self -
perpetuating . any technicians in Laos have remarked on th e
increasing amount of time they have to spend in office work ,
onferences and the compiling of administrative reports . As
has been mentioned ; many officials in the American Embassy and
the aid mission have as thei r functions the logistic support
or coordination of the other American p ersonnel, plus committees ,
conferences, memos, proposals and programing which are par t
f American business and governmental culture, and it would
be unrealistic to categorically state that they should or could
be eliminated . Even though in certain short run aspects it
ight be said that a democratic bureaucracy operates les s
flexibly than a totalitarian one where the decision-making i s
more centralized, few Americans would want to arbitraily abolis h
all of these procedures and -lake the process more authoritarian . .
Significant in this connection is the apparent conflic t
between office procedures, often resentfully called red tape ,
and action or field work . These procedures do nave the commo n
characteristics of both relying on ` actionin t

road sens e
to so e problems . Some observers have celled this the optimism
syndrome in American culture . All that is needed to solve a
iven situation is more p ersonnel, more coordination, coittees ,
money and more hard working dedicated people out in the pro-
vinces . The content of their activity app ears to be les s
important . This is certainly true in the case of the American
oiu unity in Laos, and whatever one might wish to say about
them one cannot call them idle ._ deed, much of the criticism
in this paper Has revolved about the direction of their
.energies rather than the lack of them.
The observations of a foreign scholar in a farming com-
munity in one of the western states of America may give us
some insight into the situation in Laos . That investigator
ound that the local inhabitants seemed to divide human being s
into three categories which she entitled Scenery, Machinery
and People . In the first category were the Indians on a loca l
reservation, whom the family might see and photograph on a
• Sunday drive ; the second category were migrant farm laborer s
who had to be fed, housed and supervised not unlike the farmer ' s
domestic animals ; the farmer's neighbors, relatives and friend s
with whom he socialized and with whom his children attended
chool and church represented the third category . Although
these concepts cannot be taken over ompletely into the Lao s
situation, both the scenery and machinery categories seem t o
have been applied by local Americans . Photographs and costume s
f the mountain people and the Lao are much prized ; similarly ,
the valley Lao are frequently regarded as living an idyllic
life without cares, conflicts or tensions . They also tend t o
be regarded as objects of Communist subversion, charity, o r
om munity development programs which will either 'destroy"
the country or bring about its salvation .
Certainly various program of action have been advocated
wis hsential as these are, might we not is  for a bi t
more? As a Lao friend remarked about an American official ,
.'hire X works very hard and we value his efforts, but we value
even more a person who has time to smile and talk .' Some
people may feel that the Lao do little but the latter, but can
e . not learn from each other in an atmosphere of friendship ?
et us regard the inhabitants of Laos as People .

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